When the IRS serves a Notice of Intent to Levy, the first and best posture for a taxpayer is forceful but lawful resistance. This is not about conspiracy theories or “opting out.” This is about using the law Congress wrote, the procedures the Treasury adopted, and the judicial rules that protect process. The taxpayer who knows the statutes and cases wins hearings, stays, and sometimes full suspensions of collection. Know your authorities and use them.The fundamental statute is 26 U.S.C. § 6331(a).
Read exactly:
“If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same within 10 days after notice and demand, it shall be lawful for the Secretary to collect such tax (and such further sum as shall be sufficient to cover the expenses of the levy) by levy upon all property and rights to property (except such property as is exempt under section 6334) belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax. Levy may be made upon the accrued salary or wages of any officer, employee, or elected official, of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of the United States or the District of Columbia, by serving a notice of levy on the employer (as defined in section 3401(d)) of such officer, employee, or elected official.”
That text both grants broad levy authority and prescribes a special procedure for federal wages. Do not let anyone reduce § 6331(a) to the single second sentence about federal employees. The statutory grant is the first sentence.
The Title-wide definition of “person” matters when you are arguing who may be levied. 26 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1) provides that “the term ‘person’ shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company, or corporation.”
26 U.S.C. § 7701(c) confirms that the words “includes” and “including” in Title 26 definitions “shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.”
Section 6331(c) states that
“the term ‘person’ includes an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs.”
Read together, the Code’s structure supplies a baseline definition and permits § 6331(c) to enlarge it; § 6331(c) does not, and cannot properly be read to exclude the Title-wide definition of an individual under § 7701(a)(1).The controlling Supreme Court authority on levy scope is Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108 (1959). Sims rejected the narrow reading that because § 6331(a) mentions federal employees by name the statute excludes other classes. The Court enforced levy against accrued salaries despite argument to the contrary and expressly relied on the Title-wide interpretation of “includes.”
The holding is simple and direct:
§ 6331 authorizes levy upon property and rights to property of persons liable for tax and the “includes” language does not convert a list into an exclusion. Rely on Sims if the government claims a textual restriction that would defeat levy authority. That case is the anchor for any argument that the IRS’s substantive levy power is broad but must still comply with expressly mandated procedures.If you want to defeat or delay a levy, do not litigate the abstract definition of “person” as your first move. The taxpayer’s high-leverage, legitimate claims are procedural and documentary.
Congress gave taxpayers pre-levy protections in 26 U.S.C. § 6331(d) and § 6330. Section 6331(d)(1) provides that “Levy may be made under subsection (a) upon the salary or wages or other property of any person with respect to any unpaid tax only after the Secretary has notified such person in writing of his intention to make such levy.”
Section 6331(d)(2) provides the method and timing of that notice: “The notice required under paragraph (1) shall be—(A) given in person, (B) left at the dwelling or usual place of business of such person, or (C) sent by certified or registered mail to such person’s last known address; no less than 30 days before the day of the levy.” Section 6330(a)(1) plainly states: “No levy may be made on any property or right to property of any person unless the Secretary has notified such person in writing of his right to a hearing before the Secretary regarding the proposed levy.” Section 6330(a)(3) precisely prescribes content the notice must contain: “The notice required under paragraph (1) shall include in simple and nontechnical terms—(A) the amount of unpaid tax; (B) the right of the person to request a hearing during the 30-day period under paragraph (2); and (C) the proposed action by the Secretary and the rights of the person with respect to such action, including a brief statement which sets forth—(i) the provisions of this title relating to levy and sale of property; (ii) the procedures applicable to the levy and sale of property under this title; (iii) the administrative appeals available to the taxpayer with respect to such levy and sale and the procedures relating to such appeals; and (iv) the alternatives available to taxpayers which could prevent levy on the property (including installment agreements under section 6159).”
Those procedural mandates are your primary weapons. Demand the administrative file immediately. Insist on a complete copy of the assessment, the notice and demand, the proof of service for the Notice of Intent to Levy, and all internal IRS correspondence or form-flow that produced the notice. If the IRS cannot produce evidence that the notice reached you at your last known address or that it advised you of your right to a hearing and the statutory alternatives in the required “simple and nontechnical terms,” then the levy is premature. Use the statutory text. Cite § 6331(d)(2) for the 30-day timing requirement. Cite § 6330(a)(3) for the content requirement. Cite § 6330(b) and (c) for hearing procedures.
File a timely request for a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing under § 6330 and, in that request, specifically demand suspension of collection pending the CDP hearing. If you request a CDP hearing within the 30-day window, the IRS must stay levy until the hearing decision is issued, absent certain narrow exceptions.If the IRS claims it sent a form that “cites § 6331” but did not quote or reproduce subsection (a), insist that the absence of the operative subsection materially impairs your ability to evaluate the legal basis and to invoke statutory alternatives. Section 6330(a)(3) requires the notice to include a “brief statement” that sets forth “the provisions of this title relating to levy and sale of property” and “the alternatives available to taxpayers.”
A form that omits the controlling subsection and omits explanation of alternatives can be challenged as failing § 6330’s content requirement. Be clear, professional, and exact in your demand: ask for written identification of the exact statutory subsection the IRS believes authorizes the levy; ask for the assessment computation; ask for proof of proper service of the notice as required by § 6331(d)(2); ask for the office’s rationale for the omission and whether the omission is systemic or specific. When you get to the CDP hearing, the Appeals officer must consider collection alternatives, including an installment agreement under 26 U.S.C. § 6159, an offer-in-compromise under 26 U.S.C. § 7122, or other alternatives that could reasonably prevent levy.
Use the hearing to press the agency to produce documents that show when the assessment became final, when demand was made, and whether any statutory exceptions to the stay apply. If the Appeals determination is adverse, 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) affords the taxpayer judicial review in the United States Tax Court. The Tax Court reviews the Appeals decision for abuse of discretion on collection alternatives and reviews de novo certain legal questions such as whether the collection statute was correctly applied. Be rigorous in citing holding authority. Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108 (1959), holds that the levy power of § 6331 reaches accrued salaries and that the “includes” language in Title 26 does not render the statutory list exclusive. Bowers v. United States, 423 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1970), confirms that § 6331 authorizes levy on property of any person liable for tax. Guthrie v. Sawyer, 970 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1992), follows the same principle that § 6331 applies to private taxpayers and enforces the statutory notice and levy procedures.
The taxpayer may choose or not choose to use these decisions (up to the taxpayer) to rebut any assertion that the IRS cannot levy private wages or property because the statute names federal officers in its second sentence. Do not waste time on arguments that courts deem frivolous. Claims that a natural person can “revoke” taxpayer status or simply “elect” out of federal income taxation are uniformly rejected and will expose the taxpayer to sanctions. The pathway that wins is procedural mastery and documentary pressure. Pursue the administrative record. Demand what the statute requires. Invoke the CDP hearing and force the Appeals officer to consider alternatives. If Appeals denies relief, take the statutory judicial review.
The statutory scheme gives you these procedural entitlements; they are not optional for the IRS.Finally, be prepared to use the law fully and cleanly. Quote the statutes when you write the IRS: put the exact text of § 6331(a), § 6331(d), § 6330(a)(3), and § 7701(a)(1) in your demand. Cite Sims, Bowers, and Guthrie with full citations. Ask for what the law requires: the administrative file, proof of notice and demand, proof of service of the Notice of Intent to Levy, an explanation of why the controlling statutory subsection was omitted from the notice, and an immediate suspension of levy pending CDP. That is how you convert a threatened seizure into a negotiated resolution, an installment plan, or a fully vindicated procedural victory. Use your statutory rights. The law was written for the governed. Make the government follow it.